Category: Moral Reasoning

Richard Dawkins: ‘Immoral’ not to abort Down’s foetuses

BBC News

Kathleen Hawkins

The Oxford professor posted the message on Twitter in response to a user who wrote she would be faced with “a real ethical dilemma” if she became pregnant and learned that the baby would be born with Down’s syndrome.

“Abort it and try again,” Dawkins tweeted in reply. “It would be immoral to bring it into the world if you have the choice.”

His comments have caused anger online and have been dismissed by charities, but he insists his views are “very civilised”, tweeting: “These are fetuses, diagnosed before they have human feelings.” . . . [Full Text]

Redefining the Practice of Medicine- Euthanasia in Quebec, Part 6: Participation in Killing

Abstract

Redefining the Practice of Medicine- Euthanasia in Quebec, Part 6: Participation in Killing

It appears that, even where euthanasia or assisted suicide is legal, the majority of physicians do not actually provide the services.  However, by establishing a purported legal “right” to euthanasia, ARELC generates a demand that physicians kill their patients, despite the high probability that a majority of physicians will not do so.

Often for purely pragmatic reasons, euthanasia supporters do not usually insist that an unwilling physician should be compelled to personally kill a patient.  Thus, the difficulty created by the law can be addressed by administrative measures that connect patients looking for euthanasia with the minority of physicians willing to provide it.  Nonetheless, physicians who object to euthanasia for reasons of conscience will likely be expected to facilitate access to the procedure by helping the patient find a colleague willing to provide it.

However, objecting physicians not only refuse to kill patients, but also often refuse to do anything that they believe makes them morally responsible for the killing.  This includes actions that indirectly support or facilitate it.  Hence, it is likely that most of the attacks on freedom of conscience resulting from ARELC will be preciptated, not by a refusal to kill directly, but by this kind of refusal to participate indirectly in killing.

The Criminal Code demonstrates that a physician who refuses to facilitate the killing of a patient because he does not want to be a culpable participant in killing is acting well within well-established moral and legal norms reflected in our criminal law.  Further, the polices of professional medical organizations that forbid physician participation in capital punishment, torture, and female genital cutting indicate that it is not unreasonable for objecting physicians to refuse to facilitate euthanasia even indirectly.

On the contrary: refusing to participate, even indirectly, in conduct believed to involve serious ethical violations or wrongdoing is not aberrant behaviour.  It is the response expected of physicians by professional bodies and regulators in order to avoid physician complicity in such procedures. [Full Text]

Christian conscience in a secular culture

 Reflections of an ecumenical Pentecostal

Daniel Tomberlin*

. . .The Gospel of Christ should inform believers on the political left and right, and convict sinners on the left and right. The Incarnation (God with us) means that Christ is above, in, and with all human endeavors. So yes, Christian theology and ethics should seek to inform and shape public life. That means that individual Christians, and Christian institutions, have an obligation to exercise a Christ-shaped conscience.

So then, how does a Christian exercise conscience in a pagan or secular culture? Should believers bow before the idol of state for the sake of peace?  . . .[Full Text]

 

Conscience, authority and moral intuition

The Prosblogion

Alexander Pruss*

. . . Our moral intuitions while being a genuine source of moral knowledge are often distorted by the desire to find  excuses for our own faults or, more excusably, those of
friends. Moral intuitions should not be glorified with the  name “conscience”. . .
Full Text

Some corrections and clarifications

Project letter to the Calgary Herald

Sean Murphy*

While I am pleased to see that Laura Wershler is willing to accommodate freedom of conscience among health care workers, I must correct some misleading statements included in her article (“The morning after: Pro-life agenda misrepresents the emergency contraceptive pill, or ECP”,Calgary Herald, 13 February, 2004).

In the first place, http://www.consciencelaws.org is the URL of the Protection of Conscience Project, not “Repression of Conscience”. Contrary to Ms. Wershler’s assertion, this is a non-denominational human rights project, not a not a pro-life initiative. Pro-lifers are interested in the Project and sometimes link to our website, but the Project does not take a position on the morality of controversial procedures. It is enough to recognize the controversy, and advocate the accommodation of conscientious objectors. At least one pro-life pharmacist does not use the Project pamphlet about the morning-after pill precisely because the pamphlet does not argue against its use.

Second, Ms. Wershler’s article incorrectly attributes to the Project the use of the terms “abortion drug” and “emergency contraceptive (ECP)”. The Project does not use either term, except when quoting other sources. They are confusing, and complicate articulation of freedom of conscience issues.

“Abortion drug” is an appropriate description of mifepristone (RU486), which is designed specifically to cause the abortion of an embryo that has implanted in the uterus. The morning-after pill has not been designed for that purpose, and does not act in that way.

“Emergency contraception” is a fabulously successful marketing term. However, 94% of the women who take the morning-after pill do not require it to prevent childbirth. This statistic, provided by the drug’s advocates,[1] belies the notion of ’emergency’ that is often used to browbeat conscientious objectors. As to “contraceptive”, Ms.Wershler herself acknowledges that these drugs have three mechanisms of action, one of which may prevent implantation of the early embryo, thus causing its death. This is considered by many conscientious objectors to be the moral equivalent of abortion, a term acknowledged as appropriate by some authorities,[2] though the usage is not uncontested. The Project refers to these drugs generically as the ‘morning-after pill’ because this term is widely understood. We describe the morning-after pill as “potentially abortifacient”, in the sense that it may cause the death of the early embryo, but does not necessarily do so.

A final note to prevent further confusion: the meaning of “abortifacient” in a medical or scientific context is not the same as its meaning in a moral context. In a medical context, a drug that prevents fertilization (acts contraceptively) 95 to 99 times out of a hundred would be called a contraceptive rather than a abortifacient. But in a moral context, when the outcome may be death, a drug may be treated as an abortifacient if there is even a 1% chance of it killing the embryo by preventing implantation. A number of disputes that arise about the morning-after pill are a regrettable consequence of failing to recognize these distinctions.

Notes

1. Apply a calculator to the following statement: “In 16 months of ECP services, pharmacists provided almost 12,000 ECP prescriptions, which is estimated to have prevented about 700 unintended pregnancies.” Cooper, Janet, Brenda Osmond and Melanie Rantucci, “Emergency Contraceptive Pills- Questions and Answers”. Canadian Pharmaceutical Journal, June 2000, Vol. 133, No. 5, at p. 28.

2. Keith L. Moore and T.V.N. Persaud, The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology (6th ed.) (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1998), p. 532. Quoted in Irving, Diane N., A “One-Act Drama:The Early Human Embryo:’Scientific’ Myths and Scientific Facts:Implications for Ethics and Public Policy, Medicine and Human Dignity.” International Bioethics Conference, ‘Conceiving the Embryo’, Centre Culturel, Woluwe-St. Pierre, Brussels, Belgium: October 20, 2002 (9:30 A.M.)(Revised 23 October, 2002) Note 23.