Impartiality, complicity and perversity

 Sean Murphy*

Impartiality, complicity and perversity

Benjamin Veness weighs in on behalf of the Australian Medical Students’ Association (AMSA) to demand that physicians who believe abortion is wrong should be forced to direct patients to a colleague willing to provide it (“Abortion need not be doctor’s dilemma too.” Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November, 2013).

He and medical students who share his views believe that Victoria’s abortion law is the model that ought to apply throughout Australia.  It follows from this that they believe that any Australian physician who refuses to help a patient find someone willing to do a sex selective abortion should be struck from the medical register or otherwise disciplined.

Mr. Veness correctly believes that this would be consistent with Victoria’s abortion law, and he is hardly alone in believing that physicians who refuse to facilitate abortion for reasons of conscience should be disciplined or expelled from the profession.

However, he and the students whom he represents are mistaken in their assumption that a physician who is morally opposed to abortion – whether in principle, or because he has more limited moral objections to practices like sex selective abortion – is not capable of providing information about the procedure and legal options available to a patient.  In fact, many physicians opposed to abortion are quite willing to do so for the very reasons given by Mr. Veness: that the patient may ultimately decide not to go ahead with it.

More remarkable is the fact that the outlook of Mr. Veness and the Australian Medical Students’ Association suggests that only people willing to do what they believe to be gravely wrong ought to become physicians.  Whether or not this is a condition for membership in the AMSA Mr. Veness does not say, but it is not a policy conducive to the ethical practice of medicine.

What is most striking is Mr. Veness’ belief that only physicians willing to facilitate or provide abortions are “impartial,” as if the judgement that an abortion ought to be provided does not involve a moral judgement.  A conviction that abortion is (or can be) a good thing is just as “partial” as the opposite conviction of an objecting physician.  Mr. Veness’ mistaken notion of what it means to be “impartial’ is evidence that he and the AMSA are anything but.

For some physicians, referral is an acceptable strategy for avoiding complicity in what they hold to be wrong or at least morally questionable.  Others find it unacceptable because they believe that referral and other forms of facilitation actively enable wrongdoing and make them parties to it.  Mr. Veness and the AMSA may dispute this, but it is hardly a novel idea.  It is reflected, for example, in Section 45 of the Australian Capital Territory’s Criminal Code (Complicity and common purpose).1

More relevant, perhaps, is the broad definition of “participation” developed by the American Medical Association in its prohibition of physician participation in capital punishment. This includes “an action which would assist, supervise, or contribute to the ability of another individual to directly cause the death of the condemned,” and even giving advice.2

Lest the connection with capital punishment be thought out of place here, Australian medical students and physicians should take note that the arguments used to compel objecting physicians to provide or facilitate abortion are the same ones used by euthanasia advocates who would  force physicians to lethally inject their patients, or help them find someone who will.  That has been obvious in Belgium from the beginning,3 and it has been equally evident in Canada,4 most recently in Quebec.5

What is gradually becoming clear is that policies and laws devised to ensure the “accessibility” of abortion by suppressing freedom of conscience among health care workers lead ultimately to a perverse conclusion: that one can be forced to do what one believes to be gravely wrong, even if that means killing someone else, or finding someone who is willing to do the killing.  That conclusion is profoundly inconsistent with principles that ought to inform the laws and policies of a liberal democracy.

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Notes

1.  Australian Capital Territory, Criminal Code 2002. (Accessed 2013-11-15)

2.  American Medical Association, Policy E-2.06 Capital Punishment (June, 2000) (Accessed 2013-11-15)

3.  Murphy, Sean. Belgium: Mandatory referral for euthanasia.

4.  A panel of the Royal Society of Canada recommended legalization of assisted suicide/euthanasia. The panel stated that, since physicians who are unwilling to provide what it delicately termed “certain reproductive health services” are obliged to refer patients to others who will (a contested assertion), physicians who refuse to provide (legal) euthanasia or assisted suicide for patients “are duty-bound to refer them in a timely fashion to a health care professional who will.” Schuklenk U, van Delden J.J.M, Downie J, McLean S, Upshur R, Weinstock D. Report of the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel:  End of Life Decision Making.  November, 2011, p. 61-62 (Accessed 2011-12-31).

5.  Hearings were held recently by a committee of the Quebec National Assembly concerning a bill to legalize euthanasia by physicians.  State regulators of the professions of medicine, nursing and pharmacy all stated that their codes of ethics (developed as a result of controversies about abortion and birth control) require objecting professionals to refer or find colleagues willing to provide the service(s) to which they object.  It is clear that they mean to apply the same rule to euthanasia, although it is equally clear that this causes some of them some discomfort.  See, for example, the statement of Charles Bernard on behalf of the College of Physicians of Quebec at Quebec National Assembly, Consultations & hearings on Quebec Bill 52: College of Physicians of Quebec. Tuesday 17 September 2013 – Vol. 43 no. 34, T#154

Australian regulator misrepresents physician obligations

Claim that practitioner codes require referral disproved by Australian Medical Association

Sean Murphy*

According to a report in The Examiner, a representative of the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Association told a Tasmanian legislative committee that physicians who object to a procedure for reasons of conscience are obliged by professional codes of ethics to refer patients to another physician.  Lisa McIntosh was addressing the Committee concerning a proposed Reproductive Health Bill.

Her assertion is contradicted by a submission by the Australian Medical Association Tasmania, which protested the section of the bill that would force objecting physicians to facilitate morally contested procedures by referral.  The AMA Tasmania submission included quotes from the AMA Code of Ethics and a document from the Medical Board of Australia Good Medical Practice to demonstrate that the draft legislation information paper falsely claimed that there was a duty to refer.

The Committee also heard from Catholic Archbishop Adrian Doyle, whose concerns about the proposed bill included the mandatory referral provision.

 

The problem of unregulated conscientious objection

  Sean Murphy*

In late 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) was presented with a report from its Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee expressing deep concern about the problem of “unregulated conscientious objection” in Europe.  The Committee proposed to solve this problem by having states adopt “comprehensive and clear regulations” to address it.

The Council ultimately adopted a resolution that almost completely contradicted the premises of the report, but in 2011 the theme was resurrected by Dr. Leslie Cannold, an Australian ethicist.  Dr. Cannold warned that, “[a]t best, unregulated conscientious objection is an accident waiting to happen,” and, at worst, “a sword wielded by the pious against the vulnerable with catastrophic results.”  It was, she wrote, “a pressing problem from which we can no longer, in good conscience, look away.” . . .[Full text]

 

Proposed Rwandan law would legalize abortion, make conscientious objection illegal

 Law Governing Reproductive Health

Sean Murphy*

After its approval by the Standing Committee on Social Affairs,  Rwandan Member of Parliament Ignatienne Nyirarukundo has brought a proposed Rwandan reproductive health law before the Rwandan Chamber of Deputies for consideration.  The bill is reported to have been initiated five years ago, and is apparently an improved version of a bill that was criticized for violating human rights, contradicting the Rwandan Constitution, and for being so badly translated that its provisions were sometimes given different meanings in different languages.  That bill was rejected by the Rwandan senate.

Nonetheless, the English text of the present bill3 continues to suffer from defects like incoherence and inconsistency that may be the product of poor translation.  In addition, it  include provisions that are likely to be controversial for various reasons. [Full text]

 

Abortion in “rural” British Columbia

 Researchers include city of 85,000 as part of “rural” B.C.

 Sean Murphy*

Abstract: 

Two recent research papers based on a 2011 survey of physicians providing abortion in British Columbia assert that “rural abortion services are disappearing in Canada.”  However, what the papers contribute to an understanding of the “barriers” to abortion services in rural British Columbia is doubtful, for two reasons.  First: the analytical structure proposed (the urban-rural dichotomy as defined by the authors) is inadequate.  Second: the authors ignore the significance of an important variable: the nature of the facilities or institutions where abortions are performed.  Concerns expressed about “access” to abortion are frequently accompanied by demands that freedom of conscience for health care workers should be suppressed.  Given the weaknesses noted above, the authors would have been hard-pressed to justify such a suggestion.  To their credit, they do not do so.
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