The ethical minefield of COVID-19 vaccination: Informed consent and the obligations of doctors

Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Margaret Somerville

The ethical minefield of COVID-19 vaccination: Informed consent and the obligations of doctors

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised a multitude of complex ethical issues — and new ones present themselves daily. These issues, including those related to vaccination, arise at four levels: micro or individual (for example, when a doctor vaccinates a patient); meso or institutional (regarding, for instance, a hospital’s or aged care residence’s policy on vaccinating staff); macro or societal ( a government’s decisions or public health regulations governing distribution of vaccines and access to vaccination); and mega or global (such as a nation’s obligations to provide vaccines to those in developing countries, which are without vaccines).

In many COVID-19 related decision-making situations at each of these levels, decision makers face what is called in bioethics a “world of competing sorrows” — that is, decision making in which there is no “no harm” option, but in which, instead, they must choose to whom harm will be allocated. The ethical difficulties are exacerbated when the harms and benefits do not accrue to the same people or, at least, not in equal measure. A striking example of such a situation at the macro or societal level would be the use of “lockdowns”, when the choice is between protecting public health and inflicting serious economic harm.

What I want to focus on here is a particular micro- level issue: that of a healthcare professional’s obligation to obtain a person’s informed consent to COVID-19 vaccination.

Failure to obtain an informed consent to, or an informed refusal of, medical treatment — which includes vaccination — is medical negligence (medical malpractice). Informed consent to or refusal of medical treatment has three requirements: competence, information, and voluntariness. There is a wealth of research on what is needed to establish each element, but here is a brief summary. . . Continue reading

As criteria for medical assistance in dying shifts, calls for more alternatives, support for people who are suffering

 Vancouver Sun

Kristen Holliday

The last time Ray Chwartkowski saw his sister, Cheryl Lowen, was two days before she died in December, 2019.

On that day, he was shocked to learn that her death was scheduled, as she had been approved for medical assistance in dying, often referred to as MAID.

“She never had a diagnosis for any terminal illness,” he said. “I consider her death a total tragedy.”

Chwartkowski, a digital content creator who lives in Vancouver, hasn’t seen Lowen’s official MAID application or assessment paperwork, but he believes his sister should not have been eligible for medical assistance to end her life.

He said Lowen, who was 50 when she died, had a difficult childhood and struggled with physical and mental health problems throughout her life. In mid-2019, she was diagnosed with median arcuate ligament syndrome, a chronic illness that causes severe abdominal pain.

Chwartkowski said he has compassion for her pain but is certain she didn’t meet MAID’s criteria of a reasonably foreseeable death. He also questions her ability to make a well-informed decision after receiving the difficult diagnosis.

“From what I understood, she was refusing to eat, she was refusing immediate medical attention,” said Chwartkowski, adding that she also refused surgery to treat her condition. . . .

. . . Chwartkowski said, to his knowledge, Lowen applied for MAID twice and was denied the first time. . . . continue reading