In the Footsteps of Teiresias: Treatment for Gender Dysphoria in Children and the Role of the Courts

Mike O’Connor, Bill Madden

In the Footsteps of Teiresias: Treatment for Gender Dysphoria in Children and the Role of the CourtsThe Family Court of Australia has stepped back from a previously perceived need for involvement in the approval of stage 1 and stage 2 treatments, for children requiring gender transformation. At present those children and their families who are in agreement need not seek authorisation of the Family Court to undertake either Stage 1 (pubarche blockade with gonadotrophin-releasing hormone agonists) or Stage 2 treatment (cross-hormone therapy such as oestrogen for transgender males). Stage 1 treatment to suppress pubarche would nowadays be commenced at Tanner stage 2 which commences as early as 9.96 years in girls and 10.14 years in boys. Suppression of puberty continues until the age of 16 years when cross hormonal treatment commences. This article questions the assertion that suppression of puberty by GnRH analogues either in cases of precocious puberty or gender dysphoria is “safe and reversible” and argues that it warrants ongoing caution, despite the Family Court having broadly accepted that assertion.


O’Connor M, Madden B. In the Footsteps of Teiresias: Treatment for Gender Dysphoria in Children and the Role of the Courts. J Law Med. 2019 Oct;27(1):149-163.

Abortion law in New South Wales a global first

Freedom of conscience conditional upon gestational age

Sean Murphy*

The Abortion Law Reform Act 2019 No. 11 has become law in New South Wales, Australia. It is obviously modelled on Queensland’s Termination of Pregnancy Act 2018.

The law permits abortion up to 22 weeks gestation for any reason; no medical indications are required (Section 5).  Abortion after 22 weeks gestation may be performed for any reason that two specialist practitioners find sufficient, including current and future “social circumstances” (6(3)b).

A provision for conscientious objection requires disclosure of objections to abortion by a practitioner when asked by someone (not necessarily a patient) to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion on someone else, to make a decision about whether an abortion should be provided for someone else who is over 22 weeks pregnant (Section 6), or to advise about the performance of an abortion on someone else.

The law requires disclosure of objections to abortion by a practitioner when asked by someone (not necessarily a patient) to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion on someone else [(9(1)a(i) and (ii)], to make a decision about whether an abortion should be provided for someone else who is over 22 weeks pregnant [(9(1)a(iii)], or to advise about the performance of an abortion on someone else [(9(1)a(iv)].

When a woman up to 22 weeks pregnant wants an abortion or advice about an abortion [i.e., under 9(1)a(i) or (ii)], an objecting practitioner is required to disclose his objection [9(2)] explain how she can contact a non-objecting practitioner [9(3)a], or transfer the care of the patient to a practitioner willing to provide an abortion, or to an agency (health service provider) where an abortion can be provided [9(3)b]. 

However, if the woman is over 22 weeks pregnant, a practitioner is obliged to disclose objections to abortion but, if not convinced that the abortion should be performed, is not obliged to facilitate the abortion by explaining how she can contact a non-objecting practitioner or by a transfer of care to a willing colleague. That is because  section 9(3) makes no reference to 9(1)a(iii).

Practitioners who object to abortion in principle and those who object in particular cases are often unwilling to facilitate the procedure by referral, arranging transfers of care or other means because they believe that this makes them parties to or complicit in an immoral act.  Thus, the provision for conscientious objection in the bill actually suppresses the exercise of freedom of conscience by these practitioners with respect to abortions up to 22 weeks gestation.

On this point Queensland’s Termination of Pregnancy Act, while it also suppresses the exercise of freedom of conscience by physicians who object to referral for abortion, at least does so consistently from conception to birth.

It is possible that the wording of this provision has been been muddled in New South Wales either in an attempt to put an end to the idea that only women can become pregnant, or to avoid the possibility that abortion might not be available to a woman who believes that she is a man, or who believes that she is neither a woman nor a man, but who becomes pregnant.

In any case, New South Wales is the first jurisdiction to make the exercise of freedom of conscience in relation to abortion conditional upon the gestational age of an embryo or foetus.  A physician will be free to fully exercise freedom of conscience at 22 weeks plus one day, but not at 22 weeks minus one day.  The inexact calculation of gestational age contributes further to the arbitrariness of this restriction of fundamental human freedom.

Maine, assisted suicide, and freedom of conscience

Accommodation of objecting physicians convoluted and unsatisfactory

Sean Murphy*

Introduction

Maine’s Death with Dignity Act1 was signed by the state governor on 12 June, 2019,2 to take effect on 18 September.  By the last week in August, physicians in the state were deeply divided and significant institutional health care providers were expected to opt out.3

In reviewing the Act, the Project focus is on sections relevant to the protection of those who refuse to provide or facilitate suicide for reasons of conscience.  These are convoluted and unsatisfactory.  In brief, the Act

  • imposes obligations on physicians that may be unacceptable to those who unwilling to facilitate assisted suicide,
  •  provides insufficient protection for objecting physicians not employed or by or under contract with an objecting institution,
  •  limits the ability of objecting health care facilities to maintain institutional integrity. . . [Full text]

New Jersey assisted suicide law and freedom of conscience

Lack of clarity on referral  is unsatisfactory

Sean Murphy*

Overview

New Jersey’s Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act1 came into effect on 1 August, 2019.2

The Act permits physician assisted suicide for any resident of New Jersey who is 18 years of age or over, who can make and communicate informed health care decisions, who has been diagnosed with a terminal illness and who is likely to die within six months. Physicians assist by providing a prescription for lethal medication.  The patient must make two oral requests for the medication 15 days apart, and a written request.  Two physicians must agree that the patient is decisionally competent and meets the medical criteria.  Additional consultation is required if there is concern about psychological or psychiatric conditions that may impair a patient’s judgement.  . .[Full text]

The RH Act (2012) in brief

Appendix “B” of Philippines RH Act: Rx for controversy

Sean Murphy*

An outline of principal sections of the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 relevant to freedom of conscience.

SEC. 1. Title
  • [Not reproduced here]
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy

The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons,1 including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,2 the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions3 for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood.4 . . . [Full text]