Most U.S. states ban women from suing health care providers if
they are harmed after being denied an abortion due to conscience laws, a
study has revealed.
Conscience law enables institutions and individuals to refuse to
participate in abortions on moral or religious grounds. The research
published in the journal JAMA
showed half of states have no limitations on the rights of institutions
to refuse to terminate pregnancies in such circumstances.
The study was prompted in part by recent lawsuits against Catholic hospitals that refused abortions to women having miscarriages, study author Professor Nadia N. Sawicki, Co-Director of the Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, told Newsweek. . . [Fulltext]
N Engl J Med 371;2 nejm.org july 10, 2014
If capital punishment is constitutional, as it has long been held to be, then it “necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying it out.”1 So the Supreme Court concluded in Baze v. Rees, a 2008 challenge to Kentucky’s lethal-injection protocol, in which the Court held that the means used by Kentucky did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Lethal injection procedures have changed significantly since 2008, and that fact coupled with Oklahoma’s recent botched lethal injection of Clayton Lockett, the latest in a long series of gruesome and error- ridden executions, has raised questions about whether current methods would pass constitutional muster if reviewed by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, they probably would.
This likelihood may surprise members of the medical and scientific communities who oppose involvement by their professions in implementing the death penalty. Lethal injection, the primary execution method used in all death-penalty states, was adopted precisely because its sanitized, quasi-clinical procedures were intended to ensure humane deaths consistent with the Eighth Amendment. But experiences like Clayton Lockett’s, which result from prisons’ experimentation with untested drugs and reliance on personnel with unverifiable expertise, demonstrate the dearth of safeguards for ensuring that this goal is actually achieved. Some drug companies now refuse to distribute drugs used for executions, pharmacies are reluctant to participate unless their identities are shielded, and organized medicine has taken a stand against physicians’ involvement in capital punishment. Nevertheless, states have demonstrated their willingness to continue with lethal injections, and most federal courts have allowed executions to proceed in the face of constitutional challenges. The time is therefore ripe for the medical and scientific communities to consider, once again, their role in this process. [Full Text]
33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1389, 1413-16 (2012)
Abstract: Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson asserted that no law “ought to be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority.” Since then, freedom of conscience has continued to be heralded as a fundamental principle of American society. Indeed, many current policy debates–most notably in the medical and military contexts–are predicated on the theory that claims of conscience are worthy of legal respect. This Article, which offers a comprehensive account of the contemporary treatment of conscience, challenges established assumptions and seeks to reframe the debate about the normative value of conscience in American society. This Article first clarifies contemporary understandings of conscience by systematically analyzing its treatment in positive law. It looks beyond the traditional medical, military, and religious contexts, giving a descriptive account of law’s treatment of conscience across various substantive realms, including tax evasion, civil disobedience, discrimination, and even violent terrorism. It demonstrates that legal accommodations are typically granted on an ad hoc basis, without a guiding doctrinal principle. If there is a consistent and coherent justification for treating cases differently, our legal system has thus far failed to provide it. This Article concludes that, in order for American law to reflect the kind of robust, autonomy-based respect for conscience to which every pluralistic society aspires, we must agree on a content-neutral guiding principle for negotiating future claims for legal accommodation. The alternative, the Article posits, is to concede that American society has abandoned the fundamental purpose of conscientious accommodation–namely, protecting the individual from oppressive majoritarian understandings of morality. [Full Text]